I. 1. (53) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΙ ΤΟ ΖΩΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ
1. Ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι φόβοι τε καὶ θάρρη ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἀποστροφαὶ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τίνος ἂν εἶεν; Ἢ γὰρ ψυχῆς, ἢ χρωμένης ψυχῆς σώματι, ἢ τρίτου τινὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Διχῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· ἢ 5γὰρ τὸ μῖγμα, ἢ ἄλλο ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων γινόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ δοξαζόμενα. Καὶ οὖν καὶ διάνοια καὶ δόξα ζητητέαι, πότερα ὧν τὰ πάθη, ἢ αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλως. Καὶ τὰς νοήσεις δὲ θεωρητέον, πῶς καὶ τίνος, καὶ δὴ καὶ 10αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπισκοποῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιούμενον τί ποτ᾿ ἂν εἴη. Καὶ πρότερον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τίνος; Ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι προσήκει, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάθη ἤ εἰσιν αἰσθήσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.
2. Πρῶτον δὲ ψυχὴν ληπτέον, πότερον ἄλλο μὲν ψυχή, ἄλλο δὲ ψυχῇ εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, σύνθετόν τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἤδη δέχεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ
I. 1. What is the Living Being, and What is Man?
1. Pleasures and sadnesses, fears and assurances, desires and aversions and pain—whose are they?1 They either belong to the soul or the soul using a body or a third thing composed of both (and this can be understood in two ways, either as meaning the mixture or another different thing resulting from the mixture). The same applies to the results of these feelings, both acts and opinions. So we must investigate reasoning and opinion, to see whether they belong to the same as the feelings, or whether this is true of some reasonings and opinions, and something different of others. We must also consider intellectual acts and see how they take place and who or what they belong to, and observe what sort of thing it is that acts as overseer and carries out the investigation and comes to a decision about these matters. And, first of all, who or what does sensation belong to? That is where we ought to begin, as feelings are either a sort of sensations or do not occur without sensation.
2. First we must consider soul. Is soul one thing and essential soulness another? If this is so, soul will be a composite thing and there will be nothing
- 1The starting-point of the discussion seems to be a passage of Aristotle, De Anima A. 4. 408b 1 ff., where Aristotle raises the question whether the soul is really “moved” when it has these affections. It is possible also that Plotinus has in mind (as Aristotle most probably has) Plato’s description at Laws X 897 A of the motions of soul which are prior to and the cause of the motions of body: this seems more relevant to the present discussion than the passages (Republic 429C–D and 430 A–B; Phaedo 83B) cited by Henry-Schwyzer in their apparatus fontium. (They also cite the Aristotle passage.)