LCL 546: 334-335
γνῶσις τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς παιδίοις φαινομένων ἔργων τε καὶ παθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐξ ὧν αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῆς κατάδηλοι γίγνονται. τινὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν φαίνονται δειλότατα, τινὰ δὲ καταπληκτικώ-τατα καὶ τινὰ μὲν ἄπληστα καὶ λίχνα,2 τινὰ δ’ ἐναντίως διακείμενα, καὶ τινὰ μὲν ἀναίσχυντα, τινὰ δ’ αἰσχυντηρά . . . καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἔχοντα τοιαύτας διαφοράς, ἃς ἁπάσας ἐν ἑτέροις διῆλθον. ἐνταῦθα δ’ ἀρκεῖ παραδείγματος ἕνεκα τῶν τριῶν αὐτῆς εἰδῶν τε καὶ μερῶν ἐνδεδεῖχθαι τὰς δυνάμεις ἐναντίας ὑπαρχούσας φύσει τοῖς βρέφεσιν. ἐκ τούτου γὰρ ἐνέσται συλλογίζεσθαι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν εἶναι φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς | 769K[εὔδηλον δ’ ὅτι τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα κατὰ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους ταὐτὸν σημαίνει τῷ τῆς οὐσίας]· εἴπερ γὰρ ἦν ἀπαράλλακτος αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐνήργουν τ’ ἂν τὰς αὐτὰς ἐνεργείας ἔπασχόν τ’ ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτιῶν ταὐτὰ πάθη.
Δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων οἱ παῖδες εἰς τοσοῦτον ταῖς τῶν ψυχῶν οὐσίαις, εἰς ὅσον καὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις τε καὶ τοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ταῖς δυνάμεσι. συγκεχυμένοι δ’ εἰσὶν εὐθὺς ἐν τούτῳ πολλοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων3 ἀδιάρθρωτον ἔννοιαν ἔχοντες τῆς δυνάμεως· ὡς γὰρ ἐνοικοῦντός τινος πράγματος ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὡς ἡμεῖς ταῖς οἰκίαις, οὕτω
to be stated is a knowledge of the difference of the apparent actions and affections of the soul in small children; from these the capacities of the soul become manifest. For some of them appear very timid, some very quick of apprehension, and some insatiable and gluttonous, while others are oppositely disposed. And some are shameless whereas others have a sense of shame, and they have many other such differences, all of which I went over in other places.3 Here it suffices for the sake of an example to have pointed out the capacities of the three kinds and parts of the soul which are opposite in nature in infants. From this it will be possible to infer that the nature of the soul is not the same in all. | 769KIt is quite clear, however, that the term “the nature” signifies the same as that of “the substance” in such arguments, for if the substance of the soul in them was indistinguishable,4 they would customarily carry out the same functions and would suffer the same affections from the same causes.
It is clear, therefore, that children differ from each other to such a degree in the substances of their souls as they differ also in the actions and the affections of these, and if this is so, also in the capacities. If this is so, many of the philosophers are openly confused, having an incorrect concept of “the capacity.” For just as if some matter were dwelling in the substances, as we dwell in