substantia praedicentur, quod quaecumque hoc modo dicuntur, de singulis in unum collectis tribus singulariter praedicabuntur. Hoc modo si dicimus: 20 “Pater deus est, filius deus est, spiritus sanctus deus est,” pater filius ac spiritus sanctus unus deus. Si igitur eorum una deitas una substantia est, licet dei nomen de divinitate substantialiter praedicari.
Ita pater veritas est, filius veritas est, spiritus 25 sanctus veritas est; pater filius et spiritus sanctus non tres veritates sed una veritas est. Si igitur una in his substantia una est veritas, necesse est veritatem substantialiter praedicari. De bonitate de incommutabilitate de iustitia de omnipotentia ac de ceteris 30 omnibus quae tam de singulis quam de omnibus singulariter praedicamus manifestum est substantialiter dici. Unde apparet ea quae cum in singulis separatim dici convenit nec tamen in omnibus dici queunt, non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo; 35 qui vero iste sit, posterius quaeram. Nam qui pater est, hoc vocabulum non transmittit ad filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantiale nomen hoc inditum; nam si substantiale esset, ut deus ut veritas ut iustitia ut ipsa quoque substantia, 40 de ceteris diceretur.
Item filius solus hoc recipit nomen neque cum aliis iungit sicut in deo, sicut in veritate, sicut in ceteris quae superius dixi. Spiritus quoque non est idem qui pater ac filius. Ex his igitur intellegimus 45 patrem ac filium ac spiritum sanctum non de ipsa divinitate substantialiter dici sed alio quodam modo;
is predicated of the substance of the divinity, that all those things which are said of it in this way will also be predicated severally of each of the Three combined into one. For instance if we say “the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God,” then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. If then their one godhead is one substance, the name of God may with right be predicated substantially of the divinity.
Similarly the Father is truth, the Son is truth, and the Holy Spirit is truth; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three truths, but one truth. If, then, the one substance in them is one truth, truth must of necessity be predicated substantially. So goodness, immutability, justice, omnipotence and all the other things which we predicate of the Persons singly and collectively are plainly said of them substantially. Hence it appears that what may be predicated of each single one but cannot be said of all is not predicated substantially, but in some other way; in what way I shall enquire presently. For he who is Father does not transmit this name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that this name is not attached to him as something substantial; for if it were substantial, as God, truth, justice, or substance itself, it would be affirmed of the other Persons.
Similarly the Son alone receives this name; nor does he associate it with the other Persons, as in the case of the titles God, truth, and the other predicates which I have already mentioned. The Spirit too is not the same as the Father and the Son. From these things, then, we understand that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not predicated of the divinity in a substantial manner, but in some other way.a For if