Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

LCL 73: 252-253

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iΠερὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον περὶ1129 a ποίας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων5 2μέσον· ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις.

3Ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην ἀφ᾿ ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσί, καὶ ἀφ᾿ ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ᾿ ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ10 ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω 4ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν


Nicomachean Ethics, V.

Book V

iIn regard to Justicea and Injustice, we have toBk. V. The Moral virtues concluded: Justice. c. i. Justice and Injustice, their various senses.enquire what sort of actions precisely they are concerned with, in what sense Justice is the observance of a mean, and what are the extremes between which 2that which is just is a mean. Our enquiry may follow the same procedure as our preceding investigations.

3Now we observe that everybody means by Justice that moral disposition which renders men apt to do just things, and which causes them to act justly and to wish what is just; and similarly by Injustice that disposition which makes men act unjustly and wish what is unjust. Let us then assume this definition to start with as broadly correct.

4The fact is that it is not the same with dispositions as with sciences and faculties. It seems that the

DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-nicomachean_ethics.1926