Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

LCL 73: 186-187

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μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ 8ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον—, ὥσπερ δὲ1 τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ 9τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν15 συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν· καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ 10καὶ ὅτε, οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ᾿ οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.


Nicomachean Ethics, III.

gratification be great and intense it actually overpowers the reason. Hence our indulgences should be moderate and few, and never opposed to principle—this 8is what we mean by ‘well-disciplined’ and ‘chastened’—; and the appetitive part of us should be ruled by principle, just as a boy should live in 9obedience to his tutor. Hence in the temperate man the appetitive element must be in harmony with principle. For (1) the aim of both Temperance and principle is that which is noble; and (2) the temperate man desires the right thing in the right way aft the right time, which is what principle ordains.

10Let this then be our account of Temperance.

DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-nicomachean_ethics.1926