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980 b γνεται δ᾿ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς 981 aἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι ἡ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ᾿ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποί- ησεν, 5 ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ἡ δ᾿ ἀπειρία τύχην. γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι Καλλίᾳ κάμνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ Σωκράτει καὶ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον οὕτω πολλοῖς, 10 ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν· τὸ δ᾿ ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ᾿ εἶδος ἓν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσι [ἢ]1 πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης. Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέ- ρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς 15 ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. αἴτιον δ᾿ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ᾿ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων, πλὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τῶν 20 ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων ᾧ συμβέβηκε καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου μὲν γνωρίζῃ τὸ δ᾿ ἐν τούτῳ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις δια- μαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον μᾶλλον. ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως τό γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ 25 ἐπαΐειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα

  • 1secl. Jackson.
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Metaphysics, I. i

It is from memory that men acquire experience,4 because the numerous memories of the same thing eventually produce the effect of a single experience. Experience seems very similar to science and art, but actually it is through experience that men5 acquire science and art; for as Polus rightly says, (d) art and science. “experience produces art, but inexperience chance.”a Art is produced when from many notions of experience Art the result of experience. a single universal judgement is formed with regard to like objects. To have a judgement that6 when Callias was suffering from this or that disease this or that benefited him, and similarly with Socrates and various other individuals, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who suffer from this or that disease (e.g. the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering from burning fever) is a matter of art.

It would seem that for practical purposes experience7 is in no way inferior to art; indeed we see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without experience. The reason of this is8 that experience is knowledge of particulars, but art of universals; and actions and the effects produced are all concerned with the particular. For it is not man that the physician cures, except incidentally, but Callias or Socrates or some other person similarly named, who is incidentally a man as well. So if a9 man has theory without experience, and knows the universal, but does not know the particular contained in it, he will often fail in his treatment; for it is the particular that must be treated. Nevertheless we10 consider that knowledge and proficiency belong to

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DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-metaphysics.1933