715 a ΙἘπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων εἴρηται τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ κοινῇ καὶ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον γένος περὶ τῶν ἰδίων χωρίς, τίνα τρόπον διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον, λέγω δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἕνεκά του· ὑπόκεινται γὰρ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, τό τε οὗ ἕνεκα ὡς τέλος, καὶ ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (ταῦτα 5μὲν οὖν ὡς ἕν τι σχεδὸν ὑπολαβεῖν δεῖ), τρίτον δὲ καὶ τέταρτον ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως—περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων εἴρηται (ὅ τε γὰρ λόγος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ὡς τέλος ταὐτόν, καὶ ὕλη 10τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ μέρη, παντὶ μὲν τῷ ὅλῳ τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ, τοῖς δ᾿ ἀνομοιομερέσι τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ,


Generation of Animals, I.

Generation of Animals

Book I

With one exception we have nowa spoken about I Introduction. all the partsb that are present in animals, both generally concerning them, and also taking them group by group and dealing separately with the parts peculiar to each, and have shown in what way each part exists on account of the Cause which is of a corresponding kind: I refer to the Cause which is “that for the sake of which” a thing exists.c As we know, there are four basic Causesd: (1) that for the sake of which “the thing exists, considered as its “End”: (2) the logose of the thing’s essence (really these first two should be taken as being almost one and the same): (3) the matter of the thing, and (4) that from which comes the principlef of the thing’s movement. And with one exception I have already spoken about all of these Causes, since the logos of a thing and “that for the sake of which” it exists, considered as its End, are the same: and, for animals, the matter of them is their parts (the non-uniformg parts are the matter for the animal as a whole in each case: the uniform parts are the matter for the non-uniform

DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-generation_animals.1942