Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric

LCL 193: 168-169

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φιλοῦντι, περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τοὐναντίον· καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ᾖ τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ δ᾿ ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τοὐναντίον.

5Τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἴτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι δι᾿ ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια· διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ τούτων τι· 6ἢ γὰρ δι᾿ ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάξουσιν, ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσὶν ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ εὖνοι· διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ᾿ ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν. 7ὅθεν μὲν τοίνυν φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διῃρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ κἂν ἕτερόν τις κἂν ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δ᾿ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον.

8Ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη, δι᾿ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία. 9δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς



in degree; for when a man is favorably disposed toward one on whom he is passing judgment, he either thinks that the accused has committed no wrong at all or that his offense is trifling; but if he hates him, the reverse is the case. And if a man desires anything and has good hopes of getting it, if what is to come is pleasant, he thinks that it is sure to come to pass and will be good; but if a man is unemotional or in a bad mood, it is quite the reverse.

For the orator to be trusted three qualities are necessary; for, apart from demonstrations, the factors that induce belief are three in number. These qualities are good sense, virtue, and goodwill; for speakers are wrong, both in what they say and in the advice they give, because they lack either all three or one of them. For either through want of sense they form incorrect opinions, or, if their opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not say what they think, or, if they are sensible and good,1 they lack goodwill; wherefore it may happen that they do not give the best advice, although they know what it is. These qualities are all that are necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily win the trust of his audience. The means whereby he may appear sensible and good must be inferred from the classification of the virtues;2 for to make himself appear that way, he would employ the same means as he would in the case of others. We must now speak of goodwill and friendship in our discussion of the emotions.

The emotions are all those affections that change men so as to influence their judgments, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries. And the discussion of each of them must be divided under three headings; for

DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-art_rhetoric.2020