| | 3. | Plato is wrong to class oratory as a kind of flattery (178–203) |
| B. | Counterattack (204–445) |
| | 1. | Oratory is in fact a crucial element in human life, society, and politics (204–318) |
| | | a) | Origins and purpose show central to politics and maintenance of justice (204–46) |
| | | b) | No objection that some orators (politicians) sometimes make wrong decisions (247–60) |
| | | c) | Protects against the suffering as well as the doing of wrong, which Plato (notwithstanding what he says in the Gorgias) approves of (261–305) |
| | | d) | Summary of virtues of orators, contrasted with tyrants (306–18) |
| | 2. | Excursus: the great Athenian orator-politicians defended from Plato’s unfair criticism (319–43) |
| | 3. | Good oratory and the good orator (344–445) |
| | | a) | Plato in fact admits (inconsistently) that good oratory is possible and that there has been at least one good orator (344–61) |
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| | | b) | The status and powers of good oratory and the good orator (362–437) |
| | | | (1) | Superiority over other technai (to which Plato wants to assimilate it)—(362–81) |
| | | | (2) | Possession of all the virtues (382) |
| | | | (3) | Inseparability of speech from ability to act (383–93) |
| | | | (4) | A foundation myth—Prometheus and Zeus (394–399) |
| | | | (5) | Superiority over other kinds of power and social position; ability to enhance any other technê (400–28) |
| | | | (6) | The good orator is the good man; a palinode is owed by Plato (429–37) |
| | | c) | Plato in fact agrees with this position: a palinode can be found in his writings (438–45) |
| C. | A final objection disposed of: Plato’s position cannot be rescued by use of a distinction between two types of oratory (446–61) |
| III. | Peroration (462–66) |
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DOI: 10.4159/DLCL.aelius_aristides-oration_2_reply_to_plato.2017